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IN TI-lE

SUPREME COURT
OF TI-lE

STATE OF UTAH
OWEN M. COLLETT, CANTLAY
& TANZOLA. INC., and CLARK
TANKLINES COMPANY,
Plaintiffs.
vs.

Case No.

PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

7279

OF UTAH. R. A. GOULD. and

LANG TRANSPORATION CORPORATION.
Defendants.

Reply Brief of Plaintiffs

It is our opinion that plaintiffs' original brief in this
case contains the answers to the problems and questions
suggested by the brief of the defendants.
In the hope
that a direct reply to some of the arguments of defendants
wilJ be of assistance to the court, and for the purpose of
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giving the court the· benefit of our examination of some of
the records of the Publtc Service Commission, this reply
brief is submitted.
We shall follow the arrangement
adopted by the defendants which has added subdivisions
to the second of the three points of our argument.
POINT I
A CERTIFICATE OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND
NEC'ESSITY ISSUED BY THE PUBIJC SERVICE
COMMISSION OF UTAH IS NOT A PROPERTY
RIGHT AND CANNOT -BE TRANSFERRED WITHOUT TI-lE APPROVAL OF THE COMMISSION.
Defendants offer no authority in support of their assertion that a certificate of convenience and necessity entails a
property right of some sort.
Plaintiffs' brief at page 22
refers to Gilmer v. Public Utilities Commission, 67 Utah·
222 at 235, 247 P. 284.
At the cited page the Utah
Supreme Court makes this statement:
''Practically every proposition that is urged
by plaintiffs counsel in their brief is considered
and decided against their contention in the foregoing
cases. For example:
It is contended that Mr.
Carling operated the stage line before the Utilities
Act \!Vas adopted, and hence that he had acquired
a property right vvhich he had a right to transfer to
the plaintiff without being controlled by the
commission.
That contention is fully answered
in Westhoven v. Pub. Util. Comm., Estabrook
v. Pub. Util. C'omm. and Lane v. Whitaker,
supra. ''
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This seems a sufficient ans\Yer to the argun1ent of defendants.
And Section 76-5-40 does not help defendants.
,\uthorizing the transfer of a certificate in the event of
death of the O\vner Section 76-5-40. U.C.A. 1943. refers
to ''rights. pern1its. certificates or licenses" and vests these
incorporeal rights \vith no characteristics not theretofore
existing, except the right of transfer subject to the approval
of the Public Service Commission in the event of ·death
of the holder.
If the property right contended for by
defendants existed, the right of transfer would be implied,
rather than require legislative authorization before transfer
could be pennitted.
POINT II

THE

PUBLIC SER\llCE COMMISSION OF Ur-fAH
HAS NO AUTHORIT'{ TO TRANSFER A CERTIFICATE OF PLIBLIC CONVENIENCE AND NECESSIT'{ IN THE ABSENCE OF A SHOWING OF
PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY.

SUBDIVISION 1. Under subdivision 1 the defendants
refer to the statutes and the Commission's regulations.
Defendants do not refer to the prior rules promulgated by
the Public Service Commission quoted at pages 29 and 30
of plaintiffs' brief. \Ve deem it significant that the prior
rules prohibited transfers of certificates.
The present
rules repeat that same rule and then proceed to authorize
a transfer by a procedure \vhich is set out as a cancellation
dnd re-issue.
\Ve point out. also. that there \Vas no
:'tct tutory change vvhich justified the Commission in setting up a
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procedure for making these transfers at that time and the
rule under which this procedure was brought appears to be
simply an· usurpation of authority.
Defendants also refer to Section 76-4-32, U.C.A ..
1943, as to which at this place in our reply brtef we point
out two facts:
( 1) This section is a part of Chapter 68
of the Laws of Utah, 1935, which related to consolidation,
merger, and combination of public utilities and refers to
acquisition of control by purchase of property or of stock.
and nothing in that chapter can be interpreted as granting
authority to transfer certificates of convenience and necessity
unless the authority already existed, nor does anything in
the language seem to suggest that incorporeal rights in a
license or certificate are \vithin the words ''properties'' or
"facilities"; (2)
The same year that Chapter 68, Laws
of 1935, was enacted, Chapter 65 was also enacted which
deals with motor transport corporations.
From that date
on, the motor transport chapter should control transfers
of operating rights and of properties of motor carriers, rather
than the earlier chapter which deals primarily with utilities
having immovable assets as their operating properties.
SUBDIVISION 2.
Under defendants' subdivision 2
they discuss the Gilmer case, supra.
Of course, as pointed
out in our brief at page 37, the question of the right to
transfer a certificate of convenience and necessity was not
before the Supreme Court in the Gilmer case, the action
appealed from having been a later action questioning expan~ion of service by the transferee, there having been no
challenge in the Supreme Court of the transfer and no
continuation before the Public Service Commission of the
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7
protests against the transfer.
We agree with defendants
in our inability to have found any case in this Court passing
upon this question or any other case where this Court has
had before it a certificate of convenience and necessity
previously transferred to one of the parties. The interesting
thing about the Gilmer case should be the reason for
failure to appeal to the Supreme Court the order allowing
the transfer of the certificate of convenience and necessity
originally issued to Joseph Carling and transferred by him
to T. M. Gilmer in 1924 with the approval of the ComThis court can take judicial notice of the report
mission.
It was
and order of the Commission in that transfer case.
Case No. 690 before the Commission, entitled ''In the
Matter- of the Transfer of a Certificate of Convenience and
Necessity from Joseph Carling to T. M. Gilmer," resulting
in the issuance of Certificate of Convenience and Necessity
No. 214.
It was strongly argued by the protestants in
that case that the Commission had no authority to transfer
a certificate of convenience and necessity and that it had
to consider the application as though it were a new application
for a certificate.
The Commission referred to the statute,
Section 4818, Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917, and- to the
language thereof which made it applicable to a public utility
which would ''henceforth establish or begin the construction or
(This quoted language still exists in
operation" of a carrier.
The Commission underSection 76-4.. 24, U.C.A., 1943.)
scored this quoted language in its report and said:
"This case Inay be differentiated from those
cases where the Commission granted certificates
of convenience and necessity to automobile
common carriers establishing or beginning their
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operation after the passage of the Public Utilities
Act."
And it is significant that after that case was decided
the Public Utilities Commission prornulgated its rules effective
July 6, 1933, designed to carry out Chapter 53, Session
La\vs of Utah, 1933, and ruled against transfer or assignment
of certificates, as pointed out at page 29 of plaintiffs' brief.
This was based on section 7 of said Chapter 53 which became
Section 76-5-18, U.C.A., 1943. which is not restricted to
establishment of a common carrier operation, but whtch says
simply:
''It shall be unlawful for any common motor
carrier to operate as a carrier in intrastate commerce
within this state \vithout first having obtained
from. the Commission a certificate of convenience
and necessity.·'
Thus the basis of the Commission's decision in the Gilmer
case was removed ·by the legislature in 1933, and this was
reflected in the Commission's rules of 1933.
SUBDIVISION 3.
Defendants' subdivision 3 deals
with administrative interpretation of the statute and refers to a
few well-recognized rules but does not take .cognizance of
two factors:
( 1)

The administrative interpretation for eleven years
which defendants rely on was broken by the positive
legislative pronouncement in 1941 authorizing transfer
of operating rights of deceased owners by enactment
: of Chapter 64, Laws of Utah, 1941.
If Rule li
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relied on by the defendants were the law in 194 1, the
legislative enactment \\'ould have been superfluous
as the Cornmission already had authority to transfer
a right which was not personal to the owner without
a showing of public convenience and necessity.
And
if the legislature had wanted' to permit transfers of
operating rights in all cases and not restrict such to
instances where the ovvner is deceased, the legislature
The language of the act
would have so provided.
and the scheme for effectuating the transfer strongly
suggest that the scheme in Rule II was either not
known to the legislature or \\'as being disapproved
bY it.
( 2)

At page 18 of their brief defendants quote
from Black on Interpretation
Lavvs, Second Edition,
The portion quoted is taken fron1 a
Section 94.
decision of the Utah Supreme Court in State Board
of Land Commissioners Y. Rtrie, 56 Utah 213 . and
the asterisks appearing at page 18 of the brief appear
likewise in the Supreme Court decision.
ln the place
\vhere the second set of asterisks appear Black makes
this statement:

of

''And if the statute to be construed is a
recent one - - so that official action cannot be
seriously deranged. nor private rights be very much
affected, by a change in its interpretation - - the
mere fact that subordinate officers have alreadv
begun to read it in a certain Yva y ~nd to regulat~
their action accordingly \\'ill have no weight or
influence with the courts in their search for the
true meaning of the law."
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As applied to the facts of this case, the rule stated
by Black suggests that any administrative interpretation
should be ignored.
There is no showing or suggestion
that applicants for motor carrier permits have obtained them
in the belief that they were transferable and no showing that
any person will be damaged by a ruling that they are not
transferable.
An examination of the public records of the
Commission shows that in practically every case of a
transfer there has been no protest and therefore no public
question arises and no question of damage to private interests.
SUBDIVISION 4.
At page 18 to 20 defendants emphasize the number of transfer cases where the Commission
has acted pursuant to Rule II.
There is no showing or
suggestion in the brief that any of these cases were proLested or contested or that anyone had any adverse interest
in the transfer.
One case which was contested was Case No. 2276
in the matter of the application of Salt Lake City Lines
and Utah Light & Traction Company for consent and
approval of the CoJ;Ilmission to the acquisition by the former
company of the transportation property of the latter company.
This resulted in issuance of Certificate of Convenience and
Necessity No. 640 to the Salt Lake City Lines under a
report and order dated July 12, 1944.
This report shovvs
that the price paid was based solely on the value of
physical property, with no mention of any price being paid
for a certificate of convenience and necessity ,although the
petitioners requested cancellation of the certificates of the
Traction Company and issuance of a certificate of con-
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venience and necessity to the Salt Lake City Lines.
The
report recites that the Board of Commissioners of Salt L,ake
City had approved, ratified, and confirmed a transfer to
Salt Lake City Lines of certain rights, privileges, and
franchises theretofore granted to, held, possessed and exercised by the Traction Company under which a license tax
of not less than $5,000 and not more than $15,000 was
payable annually to Salt Lake City.
(Page 6 of report.)
At page 8 the Commissio~ quoted Section 76-4-32, U.C.A.,
1943, as the controlling statute and thereafter examined
into the fairness of the price paid for the physical properties,
and whether the public interest was affected by acquisition
of the property by a foreign holding company without any
local stock ownership.
At page 8 the Commission said:
''There is no contention that public convenience and necessity does not require passenger
transportation service in the area now served by
Traction Company.
There is no issue on this
The question of public interest, however,
point.
becomes a matter at issue in the case now before
us.
~'

Thus, the Commission expressly left open, as it had done
many years earlier in the Gilmer case, the question of its
right to make a transfer of a certificate against the protests
of interested persons and without a showing of public conIn the Traction Company case
venience and necessity.
that issue had been solved by the exclusive franchise issued
by Salt Lake City and the failure of anyone to make a
protest on this ground.
Another contested transfer case was In re FullerToponce Truck Company, Cases 1747, 1748, 1749, de-
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cided by report and order dated August 12, 1935.
In
that proceeding a partnership sought to transfer its operating authority to a corporation formed by the partners.
They sought cancellation of several certificates of convenience
and necessity and re-issue to the corporation of one
But it was stipulated by all the parties that
certificate.
the evidence of public convenience and necessity supporting
issuance of the original certificates was part of the record
in the transfer case and on that stipulation the Comrnission
made a finding of public convenience and necessity.

It

therefore appears that, far from a uniform interpretation as contended by the defendants, this is probably the
first case where the Public Service Commission has squarely
passed upon the question involved in this case, and so far
as counsel on .both sides can determine the matter has not
previously been submitted to this Court.
SUBDIVISION 5.
In this subdivision the defendants
attempt to lift themselves by their own boot straps by
quoting from the report and order undoubtedly prepared by
them and signed by the Commission.
There is no issue
on the question whether the Commission adopted the defendants' theory of the case.
The issue here is whether
the Commission had the authority to do vvhat i.t did. and
the report and order which it signed contain an able exposition of the theory but hardly constitute authority for
that position before this Court.
SUBDIVISION. 6.
The argument here is notable
for its reference to two cases on page 26 defining the word

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13

"facilities" and taken from a number of cases in Words
and Phrases ,,·here "facilities" is defined.
Other cases
collected in \ \' onls and Phrases are different from those
used by the defendants and none of them seems to have
any application to the question before the Court.

SUBDI\1ISION

7.
Defendants argue under this
subdiYision that Section 76-4-32 authorizes tra~sfers of
certificates inter vivos and that Section 76-5-40 constitutes
the same authority where the holder of a certificate is deceased, and conclude at page 28 of their brief, in referring
to 76-5-40:
·'Its enactment rounds out the entire matter
of acquisitions."
We agree that 76-4-32 relates to acquisitions but do not
find that word used in 76-5-40 where the question dealt
\vith by the legislature \vas "transfer".
'vVe note, also, that 76-4-32 relates only to acquiSItions by an existing public utility, and presumably one doing
business in this state under the definition of public utility
at 76-2-1.
76-5-40 is not confined to a transfer' to a
public utility but permits transfer of the rights of a deceased owner to · any persop making application to the
Commission and obtaining its approval as being fit, willing,
and able to perform the required services, to conform to
the provisions of the act and the requirements, rules, and
regulations of the Commission.
The theory of defendants would leave completely unprovided for any applicant
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except an operating public utility in this state, unless the
Ther~ is no nice
would-be transferor were deceased.
precision of statutory control.
There is only a statutory
The
authority for transfers where the holder is deceased.
reason for this falls within the area of legislative discretion and there is before the Court no challenge of that law
It represents the one statutory exas discriminatory.
ception to the requirement of Section 76-5-18 that a
common motor carrier shall not operate in this state without
obtaining a certificate of convenience and necessity in the
manner established by that statute, which includes a showing of public convenience and necessity.
There is good reason back of the view taken by the
legislature.
Many certificates are issued to corporations
and do not . lapse upon the death of an officer, even
though the principal' stockholder.
As a means of offsetting this advantage the legislature permits the personal
representatives to carry on a deceased carrier's business
and to make a transfer to a qualified _person.
But this is no sanction of dealing in certificates of
convenience and necessity and bargaining to sell to the
highest bidder a license or certificate bestowed by the state
without cost or favor but in the public inter~ st.
(See
Estabrook v. Pub. Util. C'omm. of Ohio, 147 N.E. 761,
762.)
When a certificated carrier desires to go out of
business, let all interested persons make application for a
certificate and let them show that the public convenience
and necessity at that time require issuance of a certificate.
Should not other persons with applications pending be
heard on the question of \vho gets the certificate if the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15

public convenience and necessity require it?
(See Chicago
Railways Co. ,. . Commerce Commission, et al., 336 Ill, 51 .
167 N.E. 840, 67 A.L.R. 938, 955-956.)
For instance.
\V. S. Hatch \vas a protestant before the Commission in
this case. {R. 535).
His application for a certificate of
convenience and necessity ',.as denied in part (Exhibit 25;
R. 179) .
He \vould like to have a certificate to replace
Gould's if one is to be issued ( R. 179-181 ) . Should the
certificate gravitate to the large foreign corporation which
is able to buy Gould out, or should all applicants be
heard?
These are questions for the legislature and it
has not acted unreasonably in permitting a transfer without a showing of convenience and necessity only where the
certificate holder is deceased.
POINT III
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF lJTAH
CANNOT TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF TI-IE
EXISTENCE OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND
NECESSITY BASED UPON EVIDENCE AT A
PRIOR HEARING IN ANOTHER CASE.
Defendants try at pages 28 to 31 of their brief to
becloud the issue stated by us and which defendants appear
to have contemplated in their arguments before the Public
Service Commission and in the language of the report signed
by the Commission.
If the contention of plaintiff~ that
there is no statutory authority for a transfer of a certificate
of convenience without a showing of public convenience and
necessity is sound, then defendants can prevail in thts
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Court only on one of two theories:
( 1 ) that public con( 2)
venience and necessity was shown in this case; or
that public convenience and necessity was shown in an
earlier case and can be judicially noticed by the Commission in this case.
Of course, there is no contention that any public convenience and necessity was shown in the hearing before the
Commission and the defendants did not directly ask the
Commission to take judicial notice of the existence of
public convenience and necessity as established at prior
h~arings which involved different parties and different
issues.
We believe that the Utah cases cited at pages 38
to 4 1 of our original. brief amply sustain point Ill of our
argument.
And we believe the passages quoted at pages
32 to 38 of our original brief show that defendants
apprehended the question raised by point Ill of our argument but did not meet it.
CONCLUSION
The Public Service Commission, in permitting a transfer
of a certificate of public convenience and necessity \\'here the
holder is not deceased is acting beyond statutory authority.
To call the process a cancellation and re-issue of a new
certificate when no showipg of public convenience and
necessity is required is simply a recognition by the Commission that it knew it had no authority to permit a transfer.
There being no showing of public convenience and necessity to the applicant Lang Transportation Corporati.on, this
Court should rule that the Public Service Commission ex-
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ceeded its jurisdiction, should reYerse the order of the Public
Service Con1mission and direct that a further hearing be
held either in this case or in the pending application of l__Jang
Transportation Corporation ( R. 211 ) for issuance of a
certificate of public convenience and necessity so that the
question of public convenience and necessity can be determined.

Respectfully submitted, ·
COLLETT TANK LINES
By Richards and Bird, Attorneys
CANTLAY & TANZOLA, INC.
By Lamoreaux and Tuft, Attorneys
CLARK TANKLINES COMPAN'{
By Callister, Callister and Lewis,
Attorneys
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